A bipolar model of assertability and belief  by Lawry, Jonathan & González-Rodríguez, Inés
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 76–91Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate / i jarA bipolar model of assertability and belief
Jonathan Lawry a,*, Inés González-Rodríguez b
aDepartment of Engineering Mathematics, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TR, UK
bDept. of Maths, Stats. and Compt., University of Cantabria, Santander, Spaina r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online 23 May 2010
Keywords:
Bipolar belief
Vagueness
Label semantics
Interval-sets
Intuitionistic/interval fuzzy logic
Max-min fuzzy logic0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2010 Elsevier Inc
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2010.05.005
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: j.lawry@bris.ac.uk (J. Lawry), ia b s t r a c t
Valuation pairs are introduced as a bipolar model of the assertability of propositions. These
correspond to a pair of dual valuation functions, respectively, representing the strong prop-
erty of deﬁnite assertability and the dual weaker property of acceptable assertability. In the
case where there is uncertainty about the correct valuation pair for a language then a prob-
ability distribution is deﬁned on possible valuation pairs. This results in two measures, l+
giving the probability that a sentence is deﬁnitely assertable, and l giving the probability
that a sentence is acceptable to assert. It is shown that l+ and l can be determined
directly from a two dimensional mass function m deﬁned on pairs of sets of propositional
variables. Certain natural properties of l+ and l are easily expressed in terms of m, and in
particular we introduce certain consonance or nestedness assumptions. These capture
qualitative information in the form of assertability orderings for both the propositional
variables and the negated propositional variables. On the basis of these consonance
assumptions we show that label semantics, intuitionistic fuzzy logic and max–min fuzzy
logic can all be viewed as special cases of this bipolar model. We also show that bipolar
belief measures can be interpreted within an interval-set model.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
As communicating agents our use of natural language requires us to make constant decisions about the assertability of
propositions and sentences. In order to convey information effectively we must identify which statements can be correctly
asserted so as to be in agreement with the expectations and understandings of our fellow agents. In other words, assertabil-
ity is governed by the social practices and conventions which underpin the use of language across a population. The impor-
tance of assertability in language is also stressed by Parikh [16,17], Giles [7,8] and Kyburg [12]. For example, Parikh argues
that the vagueness inherent in language means that predicates lack a clear and explicit deﬁnition and we therefore tend to
learn the ‘usage of these words in some few cases and then we extrapolate’. What is important then in terms of effective
communication, is not whether a particular expression is true but whether it is assertible.
Our knowledge concerning the assertability of propositions is largely acquired in a distributed manner through our com-
munications and interactions with others. From this perspective the linguistic conventions governing assertability are emer-
gent and imprecisely deﬁned. Clearly, given the manner in which we learn these conventions, there is signiﬁcant uncertainty
concerning if and when a proposition can be asserted. In addition, the notion of ‘assertability’ itself would seem to be inher-
ently bipolar. This manifests itself in a distinction between those propositions which convention would deem clearly asser-
table, and those which convention would not classify as incorrect, or perhaps even dishonest, to assert. Parikh [16] observes
that:. All rights reserved.
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non-assertible in the sense that we ourselves (and many others) would reproach someone who used them. But there will
also be the intermediate kind of sentences, where we might allow their use.
For example, consider a witness in a court of law describing a suspect as being tall. Depending on the actual height of the
suspect this statement may be deemed as clearly true or clearly false, in which latter case the witness could be accused of
perjury. However, there will also be an intermediate height range for which, while there may be doubt and differing opinions
concerning the use of the description tall, it would not be deemed as deﬁnitely inappropriate and hence the witness would
not be viewed as committing perjury.
The bipolarity of assertability would seem to be a special case of what Dubois and Prade [5] refer to as symmetric bivariate
unipolarity, whereby judgements are made according to two distinct evaluations on unipolar scales. In the current context,
we have a strong and a weak evaluation criterion where the former corresponds to deﬁnite assertability and the latter to
acceptable assertability. As with many examples of this type of bipolarity there is a natural duality between the two eval-
uation criterion in that a proposition is deﬁnitely assertable if and only if it is not acceptable to assert its negation.
In this paper, we propose two bipolar measures of belief to quantify uncertainty about the assertability of propositions.
We then explore how additional epistemic assumptions result in certain well-known uncertainty calculi as special cases of
these bipolar belief measures. An outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces valuation pairs for propositional
logic as a bipolar model of assertability. In Section 3, we show that special cases of valuation pairs naturally generate three
and four valued logics. Section 4 deﬁnes bipolar belief measures in the case where the true valuation pair is uncertain, and in
Section 5 a mass function characterization is given for these measures. In Section 6, we consider how qualitative information
which orders the propositions of the language in terms of relative assertability, can be incorporated into the bipolar belief
model. In particular, we show that such information naturally results in consonance (or nestedness) in the associated mass
function. Section 7 outlines an interval-set interpretation of bipolar belief measures while Sections 8 and 9 explore the rela-
tionship between bipolar belief under certain assumptions and intuitionistic fuzzy logic and max-min fuzzy logic,
respectively.
2. Valuation pairs and bipolar assertability
In this section, we introduce valuation pairs as a formal representation of bipolar assertability conventions regarding sen-
tences of a simple propositional logic language. Let L be a language of the propositional logic with connectives ^, _ and : and
a ﬁnite set of propositional variables P = {p1, . . .,pn}. Let SL denote the sentences of L. To model the bipolarity of assertability
we introduce the notion of a valuation pair deﬁned on SL. This consists of two binary functions v+ and v linked, through
negation, by a duality relationship. The underlying idea is that v+ represents the strong criteria of deﬁnite assertability while
v represents the weaker criteria of acceptable assertability. Hence, if linguistic convention is represented by a valuation pair
~v ¼ ðvþ;vÞ then for sentence h 2 SL, v+(h) = 1 means that, given perfect information about the underlying state of the world,
there would be (almost) universal agreement with the assertion of h. On the other hand, v(h) = 1 means that there would not
be universal agreement with the assertion of :h and consequently an agent would not expect to be condemned for
asserting h.
Deﬁnition 1 (Valuations pairs). A valuation pair for L is a pair of functions~v ¼ ðvþ;vÞ such that v+:SL? {0,1}, v:SL? {0,1}
and where "h 2 SL, v+(h) = 1 iff it is correct to assert h and v(h) = 1 iff it is acceptable to assert h. Furthermore, v+ and v satisfy
the following properties: "h, u 2 SL
 v+(h ^ u) = min (v+(h),v+(u)), v(h ^ u) = min (v(h),v(u)).
 v+(h _ u) = max (v+(h),v+(u)), v(h _ u) = max (v(h),v(u)).
 vþð:hÞ ¼ 1 vðhÞ; vð:hÞ ¼ 1 vþðhÞ.
The last rule is motivated by the assumption that it is deﬁnitely correct to assert :h if and only if it is not acceptable to
assert h.
Viewed as a function from SL into {0,1}2 a valuation pair represents a complete description of an assertability convention
for the language L. The difference between v and v+ is then due to inherent vagueness in the sentences of L. So that for h 2 SL
v+(h) = 0 and v(h) = 1 means that h expresses a borderline case, which while not deﬁnitely assertable, is nonetheless accept-
able to assert.
Deﬁnition 2 (Coherence). A valuation pair ~v is said to be coherent iff v+ 6 v.
The notion of coherence formally deﬁnes v+ as a stronger criteria than v. Hence, for a coherent valuation pair (v+,v),
sentence h is deﬁnitely assertable (v+(h) = 1) only if it is also acceptable to assert h (v(h) = 1). We do not incorporate coher-
ence into Deﬁnition 1 since in some contexts we may wish to consider valuation pairs which do not satisfy coherence. In
such cases the underlying interpretation is somewhat different in that v+ and v do not then model assertability criteria
of different strength. Instead they are simply dual assertability valuations. We will consider this case in more detail in Sec-
tion 8 where we propose a characterisation of min–max fuzzy logic.
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all sentences.
Theorem 3. ~v is coherent iff "pi 2 P, v+(pi) 6 v(pi).Proof. Notation: SL(0) = {p1, . . .,pn} and SL
ðkÞ ¼ SLðk1Þ [ :h; h ^u; h _u : h;u 2 SLðk1Þ
n o
) Trivial.
 By induction on k that "W 2 SL v+(W) 6 v(W). For W 2 SL(0) the result holds by deﬁnition. Assume it holds for
W 2 SL(k). Now ifW 2 SL(k + 1) then eitherW 2 SL(k) in which case the result holds trivially, or for some h,u 2 SL(k) for which one
of the following holds:
 W = h ^ u: In this case, v+(W) = v+(h ^ u) = min (v+(h),v+(u)) 6min (v(h),v(u)) (by induction) = v(h ^ u) = v(W).
 W = h _ u: In this case, v+(W) = v+(h _ u) = max (v+(h),v+(u)) 6max (v(h),v(u)) (by induction) = v(h _ u) = v(W).
 W ¼ :h: In this case, vþðWÞ ¼ vþð:hÞ ¼ 1 vðhÞ 6 1 vþðhÞ (by induction) ¼ vð:hÞ ¼ vðWÞ. h
A classical Boolean logic model for assertability would assume that for h 2 SL, :h is (certainly) assertable if and only if h is
not (certainly) assertable. This corresponds to the assumption that v+ = v.
Deﬁnition 4 (Classical valuation pairs). Valuation pair ~v is a classical valuation pair if v+ = v.
Trivially, if ~v is a classical valuation pair then the function v = v+ = v is a standard (or classical) propositional logic
valuation.
Theorem 5. ~v is a classical valuation iff "pi 2 P v(pi) = v+(pi).Proof. By induction. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3. hDeﬁnition 6. Let V, CV # V and CLV # CV denote, respectively, the set of valuation pairs, the set of coherent valuation pairs
and the set of classical valuation pairs, which can be deﬁned on SL.
Two sentences from SL are deemed to be assertably equivalent if both their strong and weak assertability valuations agree
for all valuation pairs.
Deﬁnition 7 (Equivalence). For h, u 2 SL h and u are equivalent, denoted h  u, iff 8~v 2 VvþðhÞ ¼ vþðuÞ and v(h) = v(u).
The following theorem identiﬁes a number of important equivalences.
Theorem 8 (Important equivalences). "h,u,w 2 SL the following sentences are equivalent:
 De Morgan’s Laws: :ðh ^uÞ  :h _ :u and :ðh _uÞ  :h ^ :u.
 Double Negation: :ð:hÞ  h.
 Idempotence: h ^ h  h and h _ h  h.
 Commutativity: h _ u  u _ h and h ^ u  u ^ h.
 Associativity: h _ (u _ w)  (h _ u) _w and h ^ (u ^w)  (h ^ u) ^w.
 Distributivity: h _ (u ^ w)  (h _ u) ^ (h _ w) and h ^ (u _ w)  (h ^ u) _ (h ^ w).
Proof
 De Morgan’s Laws: vþð:ðh ^uÞÞ ¼ 1 vðh ^uÞ ¼ 1minðvðhÞ;vðuÞÞ ¼maxð1 vðhÞ;1 vðuÞÞ ¼maxðvþð:hÞ;
vþð:uÞÞ ¼ vþð:h _ :uÞ, and vð:ðh ^uÞÞ ¼ 1 vþðh ^uÞ ¼ 1minðvþðhÞ;vþðuÞÞ ¼maxð1 vþðhÞ;1 vþðuÞÞ ¼
maxðvð:hÞ;vð:uÞÞ ¼ vð:h _ :uÞ. Also, :ðh _uÞ  :h ^ :u follows similarly.
 Double Negation: vþð:ð:hÞÞ ¼ 1 vð:hÞ ¼ 1 ð1 vþðhÞÞ ¼ vþðhÞ similarly for vð:ð:hÞÞ.
 Idempotence: Follows trivially since min and max are idempotent.
 Commutative and Associative: Follows trivially since min and max are commutative and associative.
 Distributivity: Follows trivially since min distributes over max and max distributes over min. h
However, it is certainly not the case that all classical equivalences hold as can be seen from the following example:Example 9. Let L have two propositional variables p1 and p2. Let (v+,v) be deﬁned such that vþðp1Þ ¼ 0; vþðp2Þ ¼ 0;
vþð:p1Þ ¼ 1; vþð:p2Þ ¼ 0 and by duality vðp1Þ ¼ 0; vðp2Þ ¼ 1; vð:p1Þ ¼ 1; vð:p2Þ ¼ 1. In this case, vðp2 ^ :p2Þ ¼
minð1;1Þ ¼ 1 and therefore vðp1 _ ðp2 ^ :p2ÞÞ ¼maxð0;1Þ ¼ 1–vðp1Þ. Hence, p1Xp1 _ ðp2 ^ :p2Þ. Alternatively, let (v+,v)
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vð:p2Þ ¼ 1. In this case, vþðp2 _ :p2Þ ¼ 0 and therefore vþðp1 ^ ðp2 _ :p2ÞÞ ¼minð1;0Þ ¼ 0–vþðp1Þ. Hence, p1Xp1^
ðp2 _ :p2Þ.Theorem 10 (Excluded middle and non-contradiction). For all coherent valuation pairs ~v 2 CV it holds that
8h 2 SLvþðh ^ :hÞ ¼ 0 and vðh _ :hÞ ¼ 1.Proof. 8h 2 SLvþðh ^ :hÞ ¼ minðvþðhÞ;vþð:hÞÞ 6 minðvðhÞ;vþð:hÞÞ (since ~v is coherent) = min (v(h),1  v(h)) = 0. Simi-
larly, vðh _ :hÞ ¼ maxðvðhÞ;vð:hÞÞP maxðvþðhÞ; vð:hÞÞ ¼ maxðvþðhÞ;1 vþðhÞÞ ¼ 1. h
Intuitively, this result shows that for coherent valuations, it is never deﬁnitely correct to assert simultaneously one sen-
tence and its negation and it is always acceptable to assert either a sentence or its negation. Notice that for some sentences h
it may hold that vðh ^ :hÞ ¼ 1. For example, given a valuation pair where vþðpÞ ¼ vþð:pÞ ¼ 0 we have that
vðpÞ ¼ vð:pÞ ¼ vðp ^ :pÞ ¼ 1. In other words, according to Deﬁnition 1 it is acceptable to assert p ^ :p when it is accept-
able to assert p and also to assert :p.
3. Valuation pairs and ﬁnitely many valued logics
In the previous section, we have already noted the correspondence between classical valuations pairs and standard 2-val-
ued propositional logic. In this section, we explore the relationship between valuation pairs and the 3- and 4-valued logics of
Kleene [11] and Belnap [3]. For (non-classical) valuation pairs satisfying coherence there are three possible values of
(v+(h),v(h)) for any h 2 SL. These are 1 = (1,1), b = (0,1) and 0 = (0,0) where 1 denotes deﬁnitely assertable, b denotes bor-
derline assertable, and 0 denotes deﬁnitely not assertable. Using this notation we can translate the combination rules from
Deﬁnition 1 into the three valued truth tables shown in Table 1.
Now the truth functions given in Table 1 correspond exactly to those of Kleene’s three valued logic [11], all be it with a
different interpretation given to the three values. As noted by Dubois [4], since its inception there has been a tendency to
interpret truth values in many valued logic as different levels of belief, corresponding to different levels of epistemic uncer-
tainty. For example, the middle truth-value in three valued logic (here denoted b) is often interpreted as uncertainty or igno-
rance. In the current interpretation, this is not the case. If an agent accepts a valuation pair as correctly modelling
assertability for language L, then they are admitting no epistemic uncertainty whatsoever. Indeed, a valuation of b =
(0,1) for sentence h 2 SL, means that the agent is certain that h is borderline assertable. Furthermore, the fact that h is bor-
derline results from the linguistic conventions governing language use and is not a result of epistemic uncertainty. Of course,
in many cases the agent will have signiﬁcant epistemic uncertainty concerning the sentences of L, but this will manifest itself
as uncertainty regarding which is the correct valuation pair for L as we will consider in Section 4. From the above discussion
it is also clear that any three valued valuation mv:SL? {0,b,1} satisfying the truth functions in Table 1 deﬁnes a valuation
pair according to:Table 1
Truth-t
h
1
b
0
1
b
0
1
b
0vþðhÞ ¼ 1 : mvðhÞ ¼ 1
0 : otherwise

and vðhÞ ¼
1 : mvðhÞ ¼ 1
1 : mvðhÞ ¼ b
0 : otherwise
8><
>:For valuation pairs not satisfying coherence we have four possible values for (v+(h),v(h)) given by 1 = (1,1) (assertable),
b1 = (0,1) (type 1 borderline), b2 = (1,0) (type 2 borderline) and 0 = (0,0) (not assertable). Using this notation we can trans-
late the combination rules from Deﬁnition 1 into the four valued truth functions given in Table 2. The truth-functions are
equivalent to those of Belnap’s four valued-logic [3], although the underlying interpretation of the truth values is again dif-
ferent. Belnap [3] views the two intermediate truth values as corresponding to indicators of uncertainty and inconsistency,able for 3-valued logic generated by non-classical coherent valuation pairs.
u :h h ^ u h _ u
1 0 1 1
1 b b 1
1 1 0 1
b 0 b 1
b b b b
b 1 0 b
0 0 0 1
0 b 0 b
0 1 0 0
Table 2
Truth-table for 4-valued logic generated by non-coherent valuation pairs.
h u :h h ^ u h _ u
1 1 0 1 1
b1 1 b1 b1 1
b2 1 b2 b2 1
0 1 1 0 1
1 b1 0 b1 1
b1 b1 b1 b1 b1
b2 b1 b2 0 1
0 b1 1 0 b1
1 b2 0 b2 1
b1 b2 b1 0 1
b2 b2 b2 b2 b2
0 b2 1 0 b2
1 0 0 0 1
b1 0 b1 0 b1
b2 0 b2 0 b2
0 0 1 0 0
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will propose that in the presence of epistemic uncertainty about the correct choice of valuation for L one possibility is to give
equal belief values to b1 and b2 for any sentence in SL.
4. Uncertainty and bipolar belief measures
Within the proposed bipolar framework, uncertainty concerning the sentences in L effectively corresponds to uncertainty
as to which is the correct valuation pair for L. In practice, there are likely to be many different sources of this uncertainty,
however, one natural division of uncertainty types is as follows:
 Uncertainty about the linguistic conventions governing assertability for sentences in L. For example, an agent may be
uncertain as to whether or not a proposition such as ‘Bill is tall’ is deﬁnitely or acceptably assertable even if Bill’s height
is known precisely. This uncertainty naturally arises from the distributed manner in which language is learnt through
communications with other agents across a population of interacting agents.
 Uncertainty arising from a lack of knowledge concerning the referents of sentences. For example, being uncertain about
Bill’s height in the proposition ‘Bill is tall’ or the velocity of the car in the proposition ‘the car was fast’.
In general we view uncertainty as being epistemic in nature, resulting from a lack of knowledge concerning either, the
domain of discourse to which propositions refer, or the linguistic conventions governing the assertability of propositions
as part of communications. The latter requires an underlying assumption on the part of each agent that there exists a coher-
ent set of rules governing assertability to which they should adhere if they wish to be understood by other agents. In pre-
vious work we have referred to this assumption as the epistemic stance [14]. More formally, in the current bipolar model the
epistemic stance corresponds to the assumption on the part a communicating agent, that there exists a single correct valu-
ation pair for SL, even though they may have signiﬁcant uncertainty about which amongst the possible valuation pairs this is.
In the following deﬁnition, we assume that this uncertainty about valuation pairs is quantiﬁed by a probability measure w,
although clearly other epistemic uncertainty measures (e.g. possibility measures) could also be considered.
Deﬁnition 11 (Bipolar belief measures).
 Let w be a probability distribution deﬁned on V so that w(v+,v) is the agent’s subjective belief that (v+,v) is the true val-
uation pair for L.
 Let PV = {(v+,v) 2 V:w(v+,v) > 0} denote the set of possible valuation pairs.
 Let l+:SL? [0,1] such that "h 2 SL lþðhÞ ¼ w ~v 2 V : vþðhÞ ¼ 1f gð Þ.
 Let l:SL? [0,1] such that 8h 2 SLlðhÞ ¼ w ~v 2 V : vðhÞ ¼ 1f gð Þ.
Hence, according to Deﬁnition 11, for h 2 SL, l+(h) and l(h) correspond to the agent’s subjective belief that h is deﬁnitely
assertable and that h is acceptable to assert, respectively.
Theorem 12. For h,u 2 SL if h  u then l+(h) = l+(u) and l(h) = l(u).Proof. Trivial, from Deﬁnitions 7 and 11. h
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1gÞ ¼ 1 lðhÞ. The second equality then follows from Theorems 8 and 12 since ::h  h. hTheorem 14. If PV # CV then l+ 6 l.Proof. Trivial since in this case 8h 2 SL lþðhÞ ¼ w ~v 2 CV : vþðhÞ ¼ 1f gð Þ; lðhÞ ¼ w ~v 2 CV : vðhÞ ¼ 1f gð Þ and f~v 2
CV : vþðhÞ ¼ 1g# f~v 2 CV : vðhÞ ¼ 1g. h
Notice that if PV # CV then lðhÞ  lþðhÞ ¼ w ~v 2 CV : ðvþðhÞ;vðhÞÞ ¼ ð0;1Þf gð Þ and hence corresponds to the level of be-
lief that h is a borderline assertion.
Theorem 15. If PV # CLV then l+ = l.Proof. Trivial since "h 2 SL lþðhÞ ¼ w ~v 2 CLV : vþðhÞ ¼ 1f gð Þ ¼ w ~v 2 CLV : vðhÞ ¼ 1f gð Þ ¼ lðhÞ. h
Notice that, in the above case, for h 2 SL l(h) = l+(h) = l(h) corresponds to the probability of a standard propositional lo-
gic valuation satisfying h, and hence l is a probability measure on SL (see Paris [18] for an exposition).
5. A mass function characterisation
In this section, we introduce a characterisation of the bipolar belief measures l+ and l in terms of a mass function
m:2P  2P? [0,1], which gives mass values to pairs of sets of propositional variables. This approach was ﬁrst proposed by
Lawry and Gonzalez [15] and can be viewed as a generalization of Lawry’s label semantics calculus [13]. In addition to pro-
viding a link to label semantics this characterisation is useful in giving us an intuitive understanding of coherence, and by
allowing for natural deﬁnitions of the nestedness or consonance conditions to be described in Section 6.
Deﬁnition 16 (Mass functions). Given a valuation pair ~v 2 V
 Let D~v ¼ fpi 2 P : vþðpiÞ ¼ 1g.
 Let C~v ¼ fpi 2 P : vþð:piÞ ¼ 1g.
 Let m:2P  2P? [0,1] be such that for F, G # P and given a probability distribution w on V
mðF;GÞ ¼ w ~v 2 V : D~v ¼ F; C~v ¼ G
n o 
.
m(F,G) is the belief that the set of deﬁnitely assertible propositions is F and that the set of deﬁnitely assertible negated
propositions is G. Notice, that given the duality between v+ and v, m(F,G) is also the belief that Gc is the set of acceptable
propositions and that Fc is the set of acceptable negated propositions.
Notice, in fact that for any pair of sets (F,G) 2 2P  2P there is a unique valuation pair ~v 2 V , for which D~v ¼ F and C~v ¼ G.
Let this valuation pair be denoted ~v ðF;GÞ ¼ vþðF;GÞ;vðF;GÞ
 
and which is then deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 17vþðF;GÞðpiÞ ¼ 1 iff pi 2 F; vþðF;GÞð:piÞ ¼ 1 iff pi 2 G
vðF;GÞðpiÞ ¼ 1 iff pi R G; vðF;GÞð:piÞ ¼ 1 iff pi R FFrom this we can see that Deﬁnition 16 can be simpliﬁed so that:mðF;GÞ ¼ w ~v ðF;GÞ
 In the following, we will show that l+ and l can be represented as the sums of certain mass values. In particular, for
h 2 SL, we deﬁne k(h) and j(h), such that l+(h) is the sum of mass values across k(h) and l(h) is the sum of mass values
across j(h).
Deﬁnition 18 (k-Mapping [15]). Let k : SL! 22P2P be deﬁned recursively as follows: "h,u 2 SL
 k(pi) = {(F,G):pi 2 F}.
 k(h ^ u) = k(h) \ k(u).
 k(h _ u) = k(h) [ k(u).
 kð:hÞ ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞgc.
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fðF;GÞ : pi R Gg; jð:pjÞ ¼ fðF;GÞ : pj R Fg and jðpi ^ :pjÞ ¼ fðF;GÞ : pj R F; pi R Gg.
In Theorem 26, we will now show that, for h 2 SL, there is a direct equivalence between D~v ; C~v
 
2 kðhÞ and v+(h) = 1, and
between D~v ; C~v
 
2 jðhÞ and v(h) = 1.
Lemma 211 Oth
a contr8h 2 SL kð:hÞ ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞcg:Proof. Trivial since the function f:2P  2P? 2P  2P such that f(F,G) = (Gc,Fc) is a bijection. hLemma 22 (Nestedness). "W 2 SL if (F,G) 2 k(W) and F0  F and G0  G then (F0,G0) 2 k(W).Proof. By induction on k. For pi 2 P the result holds trivially. Now suppose true for k and prove for k + 1. For W 2 SL(k + 1)
either W 2 SL(k) in which case the result holds trivially, otherwise one of the following cases hold:
 W = h ^ u where h,u 2 SL(k). In this case, k(W) = k(h) \ k(u). Now suppose that (F,G) 2 k(W) then (F,G) 2 k(h) and
(F,G) 2 k(u). Hence by induction, if F0  F and G0  G then (F0,G0) 2 k(h) and (F0,G0) 2 k(u). Therefore, (F0,G0) 2
k(h) \ k(u) = k(W) as required.
 W = h _ uwhere h,u 2 SL(k). In this case, k(W) = k(h) [ k(u). Now suppose that (F,G) 2 k(W) then (F,G) 2 k(h) or (F,G) 2 k(u).
Hence by induction, if F0  F and G0  G then (F0,G0) 2 k(h) or (F0,G0) 2 k(u). Therefore, (F0,G0) 2 k(h) [ k(u) = k(W) as required.
 W ¼ :h. In this case, k(W) = {(Gc,Fc): (F,G) 2 k(h)c} by Lemma 21. Now suppose (F,G) 2 k(W) then (Gc,Fc) 2 k(h)c. Now if
F0  F and G0  G then (F0)c # Fc and (G0)c # Gc which implies by induction that ((G0)c, (F0)c) 2 k(h)c1 and hence (by Lemma
21) ðF 0;G0Þ 2 kð:hÞ ¼ kðWÞ as required. hLemma 23. "h,u 2 SL the following hold:
 kð:ðh ^uÞÞ ¼ kð:h _ :uÞ.
 kð:ðh _uÞÞ ¼ kð:h ^ :uÞ.Proof. By Lemma 21kð:ðh ^uÞÞ ¼ fðGc; FcÞ 2 kðh ^uÞcg ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞc [ kðuÞcg
¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞcg [ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðuÞcg ¼ kð:hÞ [ kð:uÞ ¼ kð:h _ :uÞBy Lemma 21kð:ðh _uÞÞ ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðh _uÞcg ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞc \ kðuÞcg
¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞcg \ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðuÞcg ¼ kð:hÞ \ kð:uÞ ¼ kð:h ^ :uÞ Lemma 24 (Double negation). 8h 2 SL kð:ð:hÞÞ ¼ kðhÞ.Proof. Suppose ðF;GÞ R kðhÞ ) ðGc; FcÞ 2 kð:hÞ ) ðGc; FcÞ R kð:hÞc ) ðF;GÞ R kð:ð:hÞÞ by Lemma 21.
Similarly, suppose ðF;GÞ R kð:ð:hÞÞ ) ðGc; FcÞ 2 kð:hÞ ) ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞc ) ðF;GÞ R kðhÞ by Lemma 21. hLemma 25. The j-mapping satisﬁes the following:
 "pi 2 P j(pi) = {(F,G):pi R G}.
 "h,u 2 SL j(h ^ u) = j(h) \ j(u).
 "h,u 2 SL j(h _ u) = j(h) [ j(u).
 8h 2 SL jð:hÞ ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 jðhÞgc .erwise suppose ((G0)c, (F0)c) R k(h)c then ((G0)c, (F0)c) 2 k(h) and hence by induction (Gc,Fc) 2 k(h). Therefore, (Gc,Fc) R k(h)c and hence ðF;GÞ R kð:hÞwhich is
adiction.
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 j(pi) = {(Gc,Fc):pi 2 F} = {(F,G):pi R G}.
 jðh ^uÞ ¼ kð:ðh ^uÞÞc ¼ kð:h _ :uÞc ¼ kð:hÞc \ kð:uÞc ¼ jðhÞ \ jðuÞ by Lemma 23.
 jðh _uÞ ¼ kð:ðh _uÞÞc ¼ kð:h ^ :uÞc ¼ kð:hÞc [ kð:uÞc ¼ jðhÞ [ jðuÞ by Lemma 23.
 jð:hÞ ¼ kð::hÞc ¼ kðhÞc ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 jðhÞgc by Lemma 24. hTheorem 26. "W 2 SL and 8~v 2 V ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 kðWÞ iff v+(W) = 1 and ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 jðWÞ iff v(W) = 1.Proof. By induction on k. If W 2 SL(0) = P then W = pi and ðD~v ; C~vÞ 2 kðWÞ iff pi 2 D~v iff v+(pi) = 1. Also ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 jðWÞ iff
ðD~v ; C~v Þ R kð:piÞ iff pi R C~v iff vþð:piÞ ¼ 0 iff v(pi) = 1 as required. Now suppose the result holds for sentences in SL(k). If
W 2 SL(k + 1) then eitherW 2 SL(k) in which case the result holds trivially, or $h,u 2 SL(k) such that one of the following holds.
 W = h ^ u: In this case, ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 kðWÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 kðh ^uÞ iff ðD~v ; C~vÞ 2 kðhÞ \ kðuÞ (by Deﬁnition 18) iff (by induction)
v+(h) = 1 and v+(u) = 1 iff v+(h ^ u) = 1. Similarly, ðD~v ; C~vÞ 2 jðWÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 jðh ^uÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 jðhÞ \ jðuÞ (by
Lemma 25) iff (by induction) v(h) = 1 and v(u) = 1 iff v(h ^ u) = 1.
 W = h _ u: In this case, ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 kðWÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 kðh _uÞ iff ðD~v ; C~vÞ 2 kðhÞ [ kðuÞ (by Deﬁnition 18) iff (by induction)
v+(h) = 1 or v+(u) = 1 iff v+(h _ u) = 1. Similarly, ðD~v ; C~vÞ 2 jðWÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 jðh _uÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 jðhÞ [ jðuÞ (by Lemma
25) iff (by induction) v(h) = 1 or v(u) = 1 iff v(h _ u) = 1.
 W ¼ :h: ðD~v ; C~vÞ 2 kðWÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 kð:hÞ iff ðD~v ; C~v Þ R jðhÞ (by Deﬁnition 19) iff (by induction) v(h) = 0 iff vþð:hÞ ¼ 1.
Similarly ðD~v ; C~v Þ 2 jðWÞ iff ðD~v ; C~vÞ 2 jð:hÞ iff ðD~v ; C~vÞ R kðhÞ (by Deﬁnition 19 and Lemma 24) iff (by induction) v+(h) = 0
iff vð:hÞ ¼ 1. hCorollary 27. 8h 2 SL lþðhÞ ¼PðF;GÞ2kðhÞmðF;GÞ and lðhÞ ¼PðF;GÞ2jðhÞmðF;GÞ.
Hence, from Corollary 27 we can see that l+ and l can be deﬁned directly from the mass function m.
The following theorems now show that coherent and classical valuation pairs can also be deﬁned by constraints on the
relationship between D~v and C~v .
Theorem 28. ~v 2 CV (i.e. ~v is coherent) iff C~v # D~v
 c
.Proof. ()) Suppose ~v is coherent then C~v ¼ fpi : vþð:piÞ ¼ 1g# fpi : vð:piÞ ¼ 1g ¼ fpi : vþðpiÞ ¼ 0g ¼ D~v
 c
.
() Suppose v is not coherent then for some pi, v+(pi) = 1 and v(pi) = 0. Hence v+(pi) = 1 and vþð:piÞ ¼ 1 which implies
that pi 2 C~v and pi 2 D~v . Therefore, C~v  D~v
 c
. hTheorem 29. ~v 2 CLV (i.e. ~v is classical) iff C~v ¼ D~v
 c
.
Proof. ()) Suppose ~v is classical then C~v ¼ fpi 2 P : vþð:piÞ ¼ 1g ¼ fpi 2 P : vð:piÞ ¼ 1g ¼ fpi 2 P : vþðpiÞ ¼ 0g ¼ D~v
 c
.
() Suppose v+– v then $pi 2 P such that v+(pi)– v(pi) (by Theorem 3). Hence, either (case 1) v+(pi) = 1 and v(pi) = 0 or
(case 2) v+(pi) = 0 and v(pi) = 1. In case 1 pi 2 D~v and pi 2 C~v contradicting C~v ¼ D~v
 c
. Similarly, in case 2
pi 2 D~v
 c
and pi 2 ðC~vÞc again contradicting C~v ¼ D~v
 c
. hDeﬁnition 30 (Focal sets). The class of focal sets of mass function m is FG ¼ fðF;GÞ : mðF;GÞ > 0g.
Notice, by Theorems 28 and 29 it follows that, PV # CV iff 8ðF;GÞ 2 FG G # Fc, and PV # CLV iff 8ðF;GÞ 2 FG G = Fc.
In the case where PV # CLV then we are effectively reduced to a one-dimensional model. In particular, we can deﬁne a
one dimensional k-mapping k0 : SL ! 22P which characterises the restriction of the two dimensional k-mapping given in Def-
inition 18 to the case where G = Fc. This one dimensional mapping is identical to that employed by Lawry [13] in order to
deﬁne appropriateness measures in the label semantics framework.
Deﬁnition 31 (One-dimensional k-mapping). The one-dimensional k-mapping is a function k0 : SL ! 22P deﬁned recursively
as follows:
 "pi 2 P k0(pi) = {F # P:pi 2 F}.
 "h,u 2 SL;k0(h ^ u) = k0(h) \ k0(u), k0(h _ u) = k0(h) [ k0(u) and k0ð:hÞ ¼ ðk0ðhÞÞc.
Theorem 32 (Restriction). "W 2 SL "F # P (F,Fc) 2 k(W) iff F 2 k0(W)
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pose true for k and prove for k + 1. ForW 2 SL(k + 1) eitherW 2 SL(k) in which case the result holds trivially, otherwise one of
the following cases hold: For h,u 2 SL(k):
 W = h ^ u. If (F,Fc) 2 k(W)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) \ k(u) (by Deﬁnition 18)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) and (F,Fc) 2 k(u)) F 2 k0(h) and F 2 k0(u)
(by inductive hypothesis)) F 2 k0(h) \ k0(u) = k0(h ^ u) = k0(W) (by Deﬁnition 31). If F 2 k0(W)) F 2 k0(h) \ k0(u) (by Deﬁ-
nition 31)) F 2 k0(h) and F 2 k0(u)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) and (F,Fc) 2 k(u) (by inductive hypothesis)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) \ k(u) =
k(h ^ u) = k(W) (by Deﬁnition 18).
 W = h _ u. If (F,Fc) 2 k(W)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) [ k(u) (by Deﬁnition 18)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) or (F,Fc) 2 k(u)) F 2 k0(h) or F 2 k0(u) (by
inductive hypothesis)) F 2 k0(h) [ k0(u) = k0(h _ u) = k0(W) (by Deﬁnition 31). If F 2 k0(W)) F 2 k0(h) [ k0(u) (by Deﬁnition
31)) F 2 k0(h) or F 2 k0(u)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) or (F,Fc) 2 k(u) (by inductive hypothesis)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h) [ k(u) = k(h _ u) = k(W)
(by Deﬁnition 18).
 W ¼ :h. If (F,Fc) 2 k(W)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h)c (by Deﬁnition 18)) F 2 k0(h)c (by inductive hypothesis) ) F 2 k0ð:hÞ ¼ k0ðWÞ (by
Deﬁnition 31). If F 2 k0(W)) F 2 k0(h)c (by Deﬁnition 31)) (F,Fc) 2 k(h)c (by inductive hypothesis)
) ðF; FcÞ 2 kð:hÞ ¼ kðWÞ (by Deﬁnition 18). hCorollary 33. If PV # CLV then l+ = l = l and "h 2 SL lðhÞ ¼PF2k0 ðhÞmðF; FcÞ.
Proof. 8h 2 SL lðhÞ ¼ lþðhÞ ¼PðF;GÞ2kðhÞmðF;GÞ ¼ (by Theorem 29 as outlined above) PðF;FcÞ2kðhÞmðF; FcÞ ¼PF2k0 ðhÞmðF; FcÞ by
Theorem 32. h
The mass function characterisation of l+ and l also allows us to clearly identify the amount of information required (i.e.
the number of numerical values which must be speciﬁed) to completely deﬁne these two measures on SL. From Theorem 26
we see that l+ and l can be uniquely deﬁned by specifying m(F,G) on all except one of the pairs of subsets (F,G). This
requires 22n  1 values. In other words, if (Fi,Gi):i = 1, . . .,22n is an enumeration of these pairs then any pair of measures
(l+,l) is characterised by a single point in the simplex hx1; . . . ; x22n i : xi P 0;
P22n
i¼1xi ¼ 1
n o
where xi =m(Fi,Gi). Furthermore,
from Theorem 28 we see that if PV # CV then it is necessary only to specify values for m(F,G) on pairs (F,G) where G # Fc.
The number of such pairs is given by
Pn
i¼0
n
i
 
2ni ¼ 3n and hence 3n  1 mass values must be speciﬁed.2 Also, trivially from
Corollary 33, we see that if PV # CLV then it is only necessary to specify m(F,Fc) for every subset F of P, and hence 2n  1 mass
values must be given.
6. Ordered belief, thresholding and consonance
In the current model, an agent’s knowledge concerning the assertability of sentences in SL takes the form of a probability
measure w on the set of possible valuation pairs for L. In this section, we investigate how qualitative information, ordering
the deﬁnite assertability of propositional variables, could be utilized by agents in order to provide a more computationally
efﬁcient means of evaluating the measures l+ and l. In particular, we consider the case where an agent’s prior knowledge
enables them to totally order both the propositional variables and the negated propositional variables in terms of their def-
inite assertability. We shall then see that such knowledge would naturally result in the mass function m satisfying conso-
nance (or nestedness) properties.
Deﬁnition 34 (Consonant). The mass function m is consonant iff 8ðF;GÞ; ðF 0;G0Þ 2 FG either F # F0 or F0 # F and either
G # G0 or G0 # G.Theorem 35. The mass function m is consonant iff there exist total orderings of P,  and 0, such that 8~v 2 PV ; vþðpiÞ ¼ 1 implies
that v+(pj) = 1 for all pj where pi  pj, and vþð:piÞ ¼ 1 implies that vþð:pjÞ ¼ 1 for all pj where pi  0pj.Proof. ()) Consider the sets Fi:$G where ðFi;GÞ 2 FG. Since m is consonant, these can be ordered such that
F1 # F2 #    # FN. Let  be any total ordering of P satisfying pi  pj for any pi,pj where pi 2 Fk+1  Fk and pj 2 Fr+1  Fr and
where NP kP r. Similarly, consider Gi:$F where ðF;GiÞ 2 FG then again these sets can be ordered such that
G1 # G2 #    # GM. Let  0 be any total ordering of P satisfying pi  0pj for any pi,pj where pi 2 Gk+1  Gk and pj 2 Gr+1  Gr
and where MP kP r.
() w.l.o.g assume that p1  p2 . . .  pn and p010p020    0p0n where p01; . . . ; p0n is a permutation of p1, . . .,pn. Then
8~v ;~v 0 2 PVD~v ¼ fpk; . . . ; png, C~v ¼ fp0r ; . . . ; p0ng, D~v
0 ¼ fpk0 ; . . . ; png and C~v
0 ¼ fp0r0 ; . . . ; p0ng where k,k0,r,r0 2 {1, . . .,n}. Hence,2 Notice that for any pair (F,G) such that G # Fc it holds that for each propositional variable pi there are three possibilities; pi 2 F, pi 2 G or pi 2 (F [ G)c. Hence,
given jPj = n propositional variables there are 3 . . .|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
n times
3 ¼ 3n possible ways of constructing (F,G).
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r0 P r or rP r0. h
Intuitively, we can think of  and 0 as representing an agent’s qualitative knowledge of deﬁnite assertability, so that
pi  pj means that pj is at least as assertable as pi, and similarly pi  0pj means that :pj is at least as assertable as :pi. Now
if an agent has access to orderings  and 0 then a natural way for them to deﬁne w would be to threshold at different posi-
tions in the two orderings with different probabilities. So for example, if threshold positions a and b have joint probability
q(a,b) then this would be the value of w for the valuation pair according to which v+(pi) = 1 only for those pi above position a
in ordering  , and vþð:pjÞ ¼ 1 only for those pj above position b in ordering  0. This thresholding approach is formalized in
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 36 (Threshold function). w is a threshold function iff there exist orderings  and 0 where w.l.o.g p1  p2 . . . pn
and p010p020    0p0n, where p01; . . . ; p0n is a permutation of p1, . . .,pn, and there exists a probability distribution q on
{1, . . .,n + 1}2 for which
PN
i¼1
PM
j¼1qðai; bjÞ ¼ 1 where 1 6 N, M 6 n + 1, n + 1P ai > ai+1P 1 and n + 1P bj > bj+1P 1 such that
w is deﬁned as follows:wð~v ðai ;bjÞÞ ¼ qðai; bjÞ where
~v ðai ;bjÞ ¼ ~v ðfpai ;...;png;fp0bj ;...;p0ngÞAlso, to simplify notation {pn + 1,pn} and fp0nþ1; p0ng are taken to denote ;.Corollary 37. m is consonant iff w is a threshold function.Proof. ()) Since m is consonant F : 9GðF;GÞ 2 FGf g ¼ fF1; . . . ; FNg ordered such that F1 # . . . # FN. Similarly
fG : 9FðF;GÞ 2 FGg ¼ fG1; . . . ;GMg where G1 #    # GM. Then by Theorem 35 there exist orderings  and 0 of P where
w.l.o.g p1 . . .  pn and p010    0p0n such that, Fi ¼ fpai ; . . . ; png and Gj ¼ fp0bj ; . . . ; p0ng where 1 6 ai+1 6 ai 6 n + 1 and
1 6 bj+1 6 bj 6 n + 1 for i = 1, . . .,N and j = 1, . . .,M. Then taking q(ai,bj) =m(Fi,Gj) gives the required threshold function.
() FG ¼ fðfpai ; . . . ; png; fp0bj ; . . . ; p0ngÞ : i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; j ¼ 1; . . . ;Mg and hence for ðF;GÞ; ðF
0;G0Þ 2 FG either F # F0 or F0 # F
and either G # G0 or G0 # G. Therefore, by Deﬁnition 34 m is consonant. h
In the case where 0 is the inverse of  and the thresholds ai and bj are chosen so as to allow no overlap between
fpai ; . . . ; png and fp0bj ; . . . ; p0ng, then the following theorem shows that the thresholding approach will only generate coherent
valuation pairs.
Theorem 38. If w is a threshold function for which  and 0 are such that p0i ¼ pniþ1 and q(ai,bj) > 0 only if ai + bj > n + 1 then
PV # CV.Proof. By Theorem 28 PV # CV iff 8~v 2 PV C~v # D~v
 c
. Now ~v 2 PV iff ~v ¼ ~v ðai ;bjÞ where ai + bj > n + 1. In this case,
D~v ; C~v
 
¼ ðfpai ; . . . ; png; fp0bj ; . . . ; p0ngÞ ¼ ðfpai ; . . . ; png; fp1; . . . ; pnbjþ1gÞ where n  bj + 1 < ai as required. h
In addition, if ai and bj are chosen so as to be opposite positions in their respective orderings, then thresholding results in
classical valuation pairs.
Theorem 39. If w is a threshold function for which  and 0 are such that p0i ¼ pniþ1 and q(ai,bj) > 0 only if bj = n + 2  ai then
PV # CLV.Proof. By Theorem 29 PV # CLV iff 8~v 2 PVC~v ¼ D~v
 c
. Now ~v 2 PV iff ~v ¼ ~v ðai ;bjÞ where ai + bj = n + 2. In this case:D~v ; C~v
 
¼ ðfpai ; . . . ;png; fp0bj ; . . . ;p0ngÞ ¼ ðfpai ; . . . ; png; fp1; . . . ;pnþ1bjgÞ ¼ ðfpai ; . . . ;png; fp1; . . . ; pnþ1ðnþ2aiÞgÞ
¼ ðfpai ; . . . ;png; fp1; . . . ;pai1gÞ ¼ D
~v ; D~v
 c as required. h
The following results show that if m is consonant then l+ and l satisfy min–max rules for conjunction and disjunction,
when restricted to certain subsets of SL.
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^;_
 be, respectively, the sentences generated from P and f:pi : pi 2 Pg by recursive application
of the connectives^ and _ only.Lemma 41. 8W 2 SL^;_þ kðWÞ ¼ k0ðWÞ  2P where k0 is the one dimensional k-mapping given in Deﬁnition 31.Proof. Let SL^;_;ð0Þþ ¼ P and SL^;_;ðkÞþ ¼ SL^;_;ðk1Þþ [ h ^u; h _u : h;u 2 SL^;_;ðk1Þþ
n o
. The result then follows by induction on k.
ForW = pi 2 P, k(pi) = {(F,G):pi 2 F} = {F:pi 2 F}  {G:G # P} = k0(pi)  2P. Now if W 2 SL^;_;ðkþ1Þþ then either W 2 SL^;_;ðkÞþ in which
case the result follows trivially, or for some h;u 2 SL^;_;ðkÞþ one of the following holds:
 W = h ^ u: In this case, k(W) = k(h) \ k(u) = (k0(h)  2P) \ (k0(u)  2P) (by induction) = (k0(h) \ k0(u))  2P = k0(h ^ u) 
2P = k0(W)  2P.
 W = h _ u: In this case, k(W) = k(h) [ k(u) = (k0(h)  2P) [ (k0(u)  2P) (by induction) = (k0(h) [ k0(u))  2P = k0(h _ u)  2P =
k0(W)  2P. hLemma 42. 8W 2 SL^;_ kðWÞ ¼ 2P  k0ðWþÞ where Wþ 2 SL^;_þ is obtained by replacing every occurrence of :pi in W with pi for
each pi 2 P.Proof. Let SL^;_;ð0Þ ¼ f:pi : pi 2 Pg and SL^;_;ðkÞ ¼ SL^;_;ðk1Þ [ h ^u; h _u : h;u 2 SL^;_;ðk1Þ
n o
. The result then follows by induc-
tion on k. For W ¼ :pi then kð:piÞ ¼ fðF;GÞ : pi 2 Gg ¼ fF : F# Pg  fG : pi 2 Gg ¼ 2P  k0ðpiÞ ¼ 2P  k0ð:pþi Þ. Now if
W 2 SL^;_;ðkþ1Þ then eitherW 2 SL^;_;ðkÞ in which case the result follows trivially, or for some h;u 2 SL^;_;ðkÞ one of the following
holds:
 W = h ^ u: In this case, k(W) = k(h) \ k(u) = (2P  k0(h+)) \ (2P  k0(u+)) (by induction) = 2P  (k0(h+) \ k0(u+)) = 2P 
k0(h+ ^ u+) = 2P  k0((h ^ u)+) = 2P  k0(W+)
 W = h _ u: In this case, k(W) = k(h) [ k(u) = (2P  k0(h+)) [ 2P  (k0(u+)) (by induction) = 2P  (k0(h+) [ k0(u+)) = 2P 
k0(h+ _ u+) = 2P  k0((h _ u)+) = 2P  k0(W+). hLemma 43. 8h 2 SL^;_þ if F 2 k0(h) and F0  F then F0 2 k0(h)Proof. Follows trivially from Lemmas 22 and 41. hTheorem 44. If m is consonant and either h;u 2 SL^;_þ or h;u 2 SL^;_ then l+(h ^ u) = min (l+(h),l+(u)), l(h ^ u) = min
(l(h),l(u)), l+(h _ u) = max (l+(h),l+(u)) and l(h _ u) = max (l(h),l(u)).Proof. Suppose that h;u 2 SL^;_þ then by consonance the focal sets can be ordered such that FG ¼ fðF1;G1Þ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞg
where F1 # . . . # FN. Then, either kðhÞ \ FG ¼ ; or kðuÞ \ FG ¼ ; in which case the result follows trivially, or by Lemmas
41 and 43 there exists k,k0 2 {1, . . .,N} such thatkðhÞ \ FG ¼ fðFk;GkÞ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞg and
kðuÞ \ FG ¼ fðFk0 ;Gk0 Þ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞg and hence
kðh ^uÞ \ FG ¼ fðFmaxðk;k0 Þ;Gmaxðk;k0 ÞÞ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞg and
kðh _uÞ \ FG ¼ fðFminðk;k0 Þ;Gminðk;k0 ÞÞ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞgHence, it follows trivially that l+(h ^ u) = min (l+(h),l+(u)) and l+(h _ u) = max (l+(h),l+(u)).
Furthermore, for h 2 SL^;_þ ;jðhÞ ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 kðhÞg ¼ fðGc; FcÞ : ðF;GÞ 2 k0ðhÞ  2Pg ¼ 2P  fFc : F 2 k0ðhÞg. Hence,
either jðhÞ \ FG ¼ ; or jðuÞ \ FG ¼ ; in which case the result follows trivially, or given consonance
jðhÞ \ FG ¼ fðFj;GjÞ : Gj ¼ Fci for some i P kg and
jðuÞ \ FG ¼ fðFj;GjÞ : Gj ¼ Fci for some i P k0g and hence
jðh ^uÞ \ FG ¼ fðFj;GjÞ : Gj ¼ Fci for some iPmaxðk; k0Þg and
jðh _uÞ \ FG ¼ fðFj;GjÞ : Gj ¼ Fci for some iPminðk; k0ÞgHence, it follows trivially that l(h ^ u) = min (l(h),l(u)) and l(h _ u) = max (l(h),l(u)).
The proof for the case where h;u 2 SL^;_ follows similar lines, given Lemmas 42 and 43 and the fact that by consonance
the focal sets can also be ordered such that fðF 01;G01Þ; . . . ; ðF 0N ;G0NÞg where G01# . . . #G0N . h
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Then lþðp1Þ ¼ 0:4;lþðp2Þ ¼ 0:4;lþð:p1Þ ¼ 0:6;lþð:p2Þ ¼ 0. Furthermore, lþðp1 ^p2Þ ¼ 0:4¼minðlþðp1Þ;lþðp2ÞÞ;lþðp1 _p2Þ ¼
0:4 ¼maxðlþðp1Þ;lþðp2ÞÞ;lþð:p1 ^ :p2Þ ¼ 0 ¼minðlþð:p1Þ;lþð:p2ÞÞ;lþð:p1 _ :p2Þ ¼ 0:6 ¼ maxðlþð:p1Þ; lþð:p2ÞÞ.
From Theorem 44 it follows that if PV # CLV and m is consonant then the resulting measure l = l+ = l has the same
calculus as appropriateness measures in the label semantics framework [13].
We now introduce a stronger form of consonance than given in Deﬁnition 34, according to which we assume that FG can
be totally ordered in terms of pairwise inclusion as follows:
Deﬁnition 46 (Pairwise consonant). m is pairwise consonant iff 8ðF;GÞ; ðF 0;G0Þ 2 FG either F # F0 and G # G0 or F0 # F and
G0 # G.
Pairwise consonance can then be linked to a version of thresholding where it is assumed that the pairs of threshold values
assigned non-zero probability can be naturally ordered in an increasingly conservative sequence. Essentially, if an agent se-
lects a relatively low (high) threshold for  then they also select a relatively low (high) threshold for  0. Thresholding is then
governed by the level of optimism or pessimism of the agent as representable on a single scale.
Deﬁnition 47 (Pairwise threshold function). w is a pairwise threshold function iff w is threshold function with respect to
orderings  and 0 where p1  p2 . . . pn and p010p020    0p0n such that there exists a sequence of pairs (a1,b1), . . ., (aN,bN)
where 1 6 N 6 n + 1,n + 1P aiP ai+1P 1,n + 1P biP bi+1P 1 and (ai,bi)– (ai+1,bi+1), and for which
PN
i¼1qðai; biÞ ¼ 1.Theorem 48. m is pairwise consonant iff w is a pairwise threshold function.Proof. ð)Þ FG ¼ fðF1;G1Þ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞg ordered such that (Fi,Gi) # (Fi+1,Gi+1) for i = 1,. . ., N. Deﬁne  and 0 as in the proof
of Theorem 35. w.l.o.g assume that p1 . . .  pn and p010 . . . ;0p0n and deﬁne ai = min{j:pj 2 Fi} and bi = min{j:p0j 2 Gi} for
i = 1, . . .,N and q(ai,bi) =m(Fi,Gi). Note, in the case that either F1 = ; or G1 = ; we take a1 = n + 1 or b1 = n + 1.
() Trivially FG ¼ fðfpai ; . . . ; png; fp0bi ; . . . ; p0ngÞ : i ¼ 1; . . . ;Ng and henceðfpaiþ1 ; . . . ; png; fp0biþ1 ; . . . ; p0ngÞ# ðfpai ; . . . ; png; fp0bi ; . . . ; p0ngÞ for i = 1, . . .,N as required. h
The following example shows that there exist pairwise threshold functions w for which PV # CV. Notice, however, that
there are no w for whichm is pairwise consonant and where PV \ CLV– ;. This follows immediately from Theorem 29, since
if F # F0 then (F0)c # Fc.
Example 49. Let P = {p1, . . .,p4} and let w be a pairwise selection function with respect to orderings p1  p2  p3  p4 and
p4  0p3  0p2  0p1where q(4,5) = 0.3,q(3,4) = 0.3 and q(2,4) = 0.4. In this case, the mass function m is given by:ðfp4g; ;Þ : 0:3; ðfp3; p4g; fp1gÞ : 0:3; ðfp2; p3; p4g; fp1gÞ : 0:4
Notice that G # Fc for all ðF;GÞ 2 FG and hence PV # CV.Theorem 50. If m is pairwise consonant then "h,u 2 SL l+(h ^ u) = min (l+(h), l+(u)) and l+(h _ u) = max (l+(h), l+(u)).Proof. If w is pairwise consonant then w.l.o.g we can assume FG ¼ fðF1;G1Þ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞgwhere Fi # Fj and Gi # Gj for jP i.
Now by Lemma 22 there exists k,k0 2 {1, . . .,N} such that:kðhÞ \ FG ¼ fðFk;GkÞ; . . . ; ðFN ;GNÞg and
kðuÞ \ FG ¼ fðFk0 ;Gk0 Þ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞgHencekðh ^uÞ \ FG ¼ fðFmaxðk;k0 Þ;Gmaxðk;k0 ÞÞ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞg and
kðh _uÞ \ FG ¼ fðFminðk;k0 Þ;Gminðk;k0 ÞÞ; . . . ; ðFN;GNÞgTherefore,lþðh ^uÞ ¼
XN
i¼maxðk;k0Þ
mðFi;GiÞ ¼min
XN
i¼k
mðFi;GiÞ;
XN
i¼k0
mðFi;GiÞ
 !
¼minðlþðhÞ;lþðuÞÞ;
lþðh _uÞ ¼
XN
i¼minðk;k0 Þ
mðFi;GiÞ ¼ max
XN
i¼k
mðFi;GiÞ;
XN
i¼k0
mðFi;GiÞ
 !
¼maxðlþðhÞ;lþðuÞÞ: 
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¼minðlðhÞ;lðuÞÞ:Similarly for l(h _ u). h
From Theorem 50 we see that pairwise consonance results in a totally functional calculus for l+ and l. This is in contrast
to consonance, the assumption of which only results in a functional calculus for sentences restricted to either SL^;_þ or SL
^;_
 .
In terms of complexity notice that if m is consonant then the number of values required to deﬁne m completely, and con-
sequently l+ and l on all sentences in SL, is of order n2. This follows from the fact n is the length of the longest possible
sequence of nested subsets of P. In the case where we are restricted to classical valuation pairs, then for consonant m we
need only give masses for a nested sequence of possible values for D~v and hence only of order n values must be speciﬁed.
Finally, if m satisﬁes pairwise consonance and PV # CV then we can now determine l+ and l as functions of the values
l+(p1), . . .,l+(pn) and lþð:p1Þ; . . . ;lþð:pnÞ (alternatively l(p1), . . .,l(pn)), in which case only 2n values must be speciﬁed.
The following sections now explore the relationship between bipolar belief measures and several well known methodol-
ogies for approximate reasoning.
7. Relating bipolar belief and interval-set models
Interval-set models [20] are a family of approximate reasoning methodologies where imprecise knowledge about some
value or outcome x, is represented by a pair of sets [A1,A2] where A1 # A2 # U and where U is the complete set of possible
values of x. A1, corresponding to the lower bound of the interval-set, identiﬁes those elements in U which are deﬁnitely pos-
sible values for x, while A2, corresponding to the upper bound of the interval-set, identiﬁes those elements in U which have
not been ruled out as being impossible values for x. Now, if we restrict consideration to coherent valuation pairs then, for sen-
tence h 2 SL, learning that h can be asserted (i.e. that h is not deﬁnitely not assertable) means that our knowledge about the
true valuation pair for L is represented by the interval-set [I*(h),I*(h)] where:I	ðhÞ ¼ f~v 2 CL : vþðhÞ ¼ 1g and I	ðhÞ ¼ f~v 2 CL : vðhÞ ¼ 1g:
Notice that given the link between coherent valuation pairs and Kleene’s three-valued logic outlined in Section 3 it holds
that:I	ðhÞ ¼ fmv : mvðhÞ ¼ 1g and I	ðhÞ ¼ fmv : mvðhÞ 2 fb;1gg:
This links the coherent valuation pair model to the interval-set model for three-valued logic proposed by Yao and Li [21].
Now given a probability w on CV (or alternatively on the set of three-valued truth-functions for L) it follows easily that
l+(h) = w(I*(h)) and l(h) =w(I*(h)). Such measures were also proposed by Yao and Li [20], although confusingly in the brief
discussion in [20] they are described as being interval probabilities. This interpretation is problematic for the following rea-
son. By deﬁnition lower and upper probability measures P and P deﬁned on SL must satisfy the properties
PðWÞ ¼ PðWÞ ¼ 1 and Pð:WÞ ¼ Pð:WÞ ¼ 0 for any classical (two-valued) tautologyW. However, from Example 9 we see that
there are coherent valuation pairs for which vþðpi _ :piÞ ¼ 0 and vðpi ^ :piÞ ¼ 1 for a given propositional variable pi. Con-
sequently there are measures l+ and l for which lþðpi _ :piÞ < 1 and lðpi ^ :piÞ > 0, which violates the above conditions
for lower and upper probabilities. In other words, while l+ and l are clearly lower and upper measures of belief they are
not, in general, lower and upper probabilities on SL.
8. Relating bipolar belief and intuitionistic fuzzy logic
From Theorem 50 and Corollary 51 it is apparent that in the case where PV # CV and the mass function m is pairwise
consonant, then there is a clear relationship between the bipolar measures l+ and l and intuitionistic fuzzy logic (IFL)
as proposed by Atanassov [1,2]. The basis of IFL are two measures s:SL? [0,1], corresponding to truth degree, and
m:SL? [0,1] corresponding to falsity degree. A duality relationship is then deﬁned between s and m such that
8h 2 SLsð:hÞ ¼ mðhÞ and mð:hÞ ¼ sðhÞ. It is also assumed that s(h) + m(h) 6 1. Furthermore, s and m are fully truth-functional
satisfying the following combination rules for ^ and _:"h,u 2 SL,
 s(h ^ u) = min (s(h), s(u)), m(h ^ u) = max (m(h), m(u)).
 s(h _ u) = max (s(h), s(u)), m(h _ u) = min (m(h), m(u)).
Now given l+ and l for which PV # CV and m is pairwise consonant, "h 2 SL let s(h) = l+(h) and mðhÞ ¼ 1 lðhÞ ¼
lþð:hÞ. In other words, s(h) is deﬁned as the belief that h is deﬁnitely assertable and m(h) is deﬁned as the belief that :h
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immediately have that s(h) + m(h) 6 1. Also, by Theorem 50 and Corollary 50 the above combination rules for s and m follow
straightforwardly. Recall from Theorem 10 that 8h 2 SL;lþðh ^ :hÞ ¼ 0. Consequently, by Theorem 50, minðlþðhÞ;
lþð:hÞÞ ¼ 0 and hence any truth and falsity measures based on l+ and l must also satisfy "h 2 SL min (s(h),m(h)) = 0. This
is a rather strong additional condition not usually required in IFL.
Dubois et al. [6] question the interpretation of IFL as an intuitionistic logic. For example, unlike intuitionistic logic, IFL
satisﬁes double negation while it does not satisfy the law of non-contradiction. This criticism would seem to be borne
out under the current interpretation, since the fundamental notion underling the measures l+ and l is that of valuation
pairs, and valuation pairs do not seem to be at all intuitionistic in nature. For instance, from Theorem 8 we see that the
double negation law is strongly validated in the sense that for both the strong and weak measures, vþð::hÞ ¼
vþðhÞ and vð::hÞ ¼ vðhÞ. Furthermore, Theorem 10 shows that the behaviour of valuation pairs with regard to the laws
of excluded middle and non-contradiction differs signiﬁcantly from intuitionistic logic. Indeed, while the stronger valuation
function v+ does not satisfy excluded middle, the weaker valuation function v does. Similarly, while v+ satisﬁes the law of
non-contradiction, v does not. Indeed the behaviour of (v+,v) with regard to these laws is exactly what would be expected
from two criteria, one weaker and one stronger, related in a bipolar manner, rather than being based on the notion of jus-
tiﬁability as is the case in intuitionistic logic.
Dubois et al. [6] also point out the isomorphic relationship between IFL and an older notion of interval fuzzy logic inde-
pendently introduced by Zadeh [23], Grattan-Guiness [9], Jahn [10] and Sambuc [19]. In this framework, lower and upper
truth degrees are deﬁned, s:SL? [0,1] and s : SL! ½0;1
, satisfying "h 2 SL sðhÞ 6 sðhÞ. Combination functions for the basic
connectives are then given by:
 sð:hÞ ¼ 1 sðhÞ and sð:hÞ ¼ 1 sðhÞ.
 s(h ^ u) = min (s(h), s(u)) and sðh ^uÞ ¼ minðsðhÞ; sðuÞÞ.
 s(h _ u) = max (s(h), s(u)) and sðh _uÞ ¼ maxðsðhÞ; sðuÞÞ.
If we again assume that PV # CV and thatm is pairwise consonant, then the interval fuzzy logic calculus can be obtained
simply by taking s = l+ and s ¼ l. However, again by Theorem 10 we would have the added condition that "h either s(h) = 0
or sðhÞ ¼ 1.
9. Relating bipolar belief and min–max fuzzy logic
Zadeh’s (precise-valued) min–max fuzzy logic [22] can also be characterized as a special case of bipolar belief providing
we are prepared to drop the requirement that valuation pairs are coherent and replace it with a symmetry condition giving
equal status to v+ and v. This means that we can no longer interpret v+ and v as, respectively, stronger and weaker asser-
tability conditions. Instead v+ and v are simply dual indicators of assertability where h is assertable according to v if and
only if :h is not assertable according to v+, and vice versa. An aspect of bipolarity remains in that distinct valuations are made
for propositional variables and their negations. Given that equal status is now accorded to v+ and v, it is perhaps reasonable
to assume that there should be equal levels of belief in valuations (v+,v) and (v,v+) as required by the following symmetry
condition.
Deﬁnition 52 (Valuation symmetry). w satisﬁes valuation symmetry if and only if 8~v 2 V wððvþ;vÞÞ ¼ wððv;vþÞÞ.Theorem 53. w satisﬁes valuation symmetry if and only if "F, G # P m(F,G) = m(Gc,Fc).Proof. Notice that for F;G# P~v ðGc ;FcÞ ¼ ðvðF;GÞ;vþðF;GÞÞ since by Deﬁnition 17vþðGc ;FcÞðpiÞ ¼ 1 iff pi R Giffv

ðF;GÞðpiÞ ¼ 1 and
vþðGc ;FcÞð:piÞ ¼ 1 iff pi R Fiffv

ðF;GÞð:piÞ ¼ 1()) 8F;G# P mðF;GÞ ¼ w ~v ðF;GÞ
  ¼ wð~v ðGc ;FcÞÞ by valuation symmetry =m(Gc,Fc).() 8~v 2 V let F ¼ D~v and G ¼ C~v . Then
w((v+,v)) =m(F,G) =m(Gc,Fc) = w((v,v+)). hCorollary 54. If w satisﬁes valuation symmetry then "h 2 SL l+(h) = l(h).Proof. Notice that "h 2 SL (F,G) 2 k(h) if and only if (Gc,Fc) 2 j(h). Then lþðhÞ ¼PðF;GÞ2kðhÞmðF;GÞ ¼PðGc ;FcÞ2jðhÞmðF;GÞ ¼P
ðGc ;FcÞ2jðhÞmðGc; FcÞ by Theorem 53 ¼
P
ðF;GÞ2jðhÞmðF;GÞ ¼ lðhÞ. h
Hence, if w satisﬁes valuation symmetry and m is pairwise consonant then by Corollary 54, Theorem 50 and Corollary 51
we have that l = l+ = l obeys the following combination laws as proposed by Zadeh [22] for fuzzy truth values:
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 l(h ^ u) = min (l(h),l(u)).
 l(h _ u) = max (l(h),l(u)).
Example 55. Let P = {p1,p2,p3,p4} then the following mass function satisﬁes both valuation symmetry and pairwise
consonance:m :¼ ð;; fp2gÞ : 0:3; ðfp1g; fp2;p3gÞ : 0:2; ðfp1; p4g; fp2;p3;p4gÞ : 0:2; ðfp1; p4; p3g; fp1;p2;p3;p4gÞ : 0:3:10. Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a bipolar model for the assertability of propositions formalized in terms of valuation
pairs. These are pairs of dual evaluation functions v+ and v where, typically, v+ represents the strong property of deﬁnite
assertability and v the weaker property of acceptable assertability. Valuation pairs can be linked to ﬁnitely many valued
logics depending on certain assumptions. For example, if v+ = v then valuation pairs correspond to classical two valued logic.
Alternatively, if v+ 6 v (coherence) then we have Kleene’s three valued logic and if coherence is not satisﬁed then we have
Belnap’s four valued logic.
In cases where there is uncertainty about the correct valuation pair for the language we have assumed that a probability
distribution can be deﬁned on possible valuation pairs. From this, two measures l+ and l are deﬁned, where for sentence h,
l+(h) is the probability that v+(h) = 1 and l(h) is the probability that v(h) = 1. These belief measures can also be deﬁned
directly from a mass function m:2P  2P? [0,1], where m(F,G) is the probability that F is the set of assertable propositional
variables, and G is the set of assertable negated propositional variables.
A consonant or nested mass function can naturally result from qualitative information in the form of separate assertabil-
ity orderings for propositional variables and negated propositional variables. In general consonance does not result in a fully
functional calculus for l+ and l, but does mean that min and max rules, for conjunction and disjunction, respectively, do
hold for sentences restricted to either SL^;_þ and SL
^;_
 . A stronger pairwise consonance assumption allows us to order the focal
sets of m by pairwise inclusion. If pairwise consonance is satisﬁed then l+ and l obey the min–max combination rules for
all sentences.
A summary of the relationship between the proposed bipolar belief model and other well known calculi is as follows.
Assuming consonance and restricting to classical valuation pairs results in the label semantics calculus for appropriateness
measures. Restricting consideration to coherent valuation pairs means that for sentence h 2 SL, l+(h) and l(h) can be inter-
preted as lower and upper measures generated by applying a probability distribution on the set of three-valued truth-func-
tions for L, to an interval-set consisting of the lower and upper truth sets for h. Despite this interpretation, however, l+ and
l are not, in general, lower and upper probability measures on SL. Assuming pairwise consonance and restricting to coher-
ent valuation pairs results in a calculus which is isomorphic to intuitionistic fuzzy logic and interval fuzzy logic. Alterna-
tively, if coherence is replaced by the valuation symmetry condition and pairwise consonance is assumed then we obtain
a single measure satisfying standard min–max fuzzy logic.
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